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Abstract
We investigate the merger decision between two rms in an outsourcing relationship, one upstream
and the other downstream. The inter-rm relationship is subject both to ex ante matching uncertainty
and to contractual e¢ ciency issues. Cross-border merger is assumed to solve the latter problem, but
at the expense of curtailing the match-searching process. The trade-o¤ between these two factors is
assumed to determine the dynamics of foreign direct investment in this kind of industry.
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1 Introduction
Alongside the rapid growth in world trade in recent decades, there has been an even more rapid growth in
international trade in intermediate goods. It is becoming increasingly common for goods to be produced by a
vertical supply chain that stretches over more than one country a process known as vertical fragmentation
(Feenstra, 1998; Hummels et al., 2001; Yi, 2003). In consequence, the share of imported components in
spending on nal goods has generally been rising. For example, Spencer (2005) reports that, from 1974 to
1993, imports as a proportion of total purchases of electrical equipment and machinery rose from 4.5% to
11.6% in the USA and from 13.2% to 30.9% in Canada.
The drastic growth in vertical fragmentation and the international sourcing of intermediate goods raises
the question: How are vertical, cross-border business relationships organised? We analyse the procurement
process of a downstream rm in the North that wants to buy components from, or have them processed by,
an upstream rm in the South. The downstream Northern rm must choose between two possible structures
for its vertical trading relationship: vertical foreign direct investment (FDI), where it merges with a Southern
component supplier, and outsourcing, where it trades with a Southern rm through an arms length contract.
Figure 1 below, which is taken from Spencer (2005), charts the huge growth of Chinas manufacturing
exports between 1988 and 2003. In 2003, the majority (57%) of manufacturing exports from China were
so-called processing exports, represented by the sum of the black and grey bars in the gure. Processing
exportsare exports produced using imported inputs, so the processing activity in China forms part of an
international supply chain, and the data allow us to analyse how such vertical trade is organised.
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The black bars in Figure 1, labelled FIE Processing Export, are the exports of processed components
by foreign-owned enterprises (Foreign Invested Enterprises) in China, and they result from vertical FDI in
China. The grey bars, on the other hand, are exports of processed components that result from outsourcing
contracts between foreign buyers and independent Chinese rms.
The message of Figure 1 is that vertical processingtrade with China is increasingly organised through
FDI rather than outsourcing the black bars grow in size over time relative to the grey bars. Our model
of the FDI/outsourcing decision is consistent with this stylised fact that vertical FDI grows in importance
relative to outsourcing over time.
The baseline version of our model analyses a Northern rms search for a trading partner in the South.
By paying a xed search cost, the Northern rm meets a randomly chosen Southern rm. The randomness
relates to the quality of the match between the two rms; that is, the total protability of the vertical trading
relationship. Next, the Northern rm must choose how to structure its relationship with the Southern rm.
The choice between merging (vertical FDI) and contracting (outsourcing) incorporates the key trade-o¤
in our model.
A merger is irreversible (demerger is assumed to be prohibitively costly), but it maximises the value
from the vertical trading relationship. In contrast, outsourcing relationships are more exible (arms length
contracts last for only one period), but due to contractual ine¢ ciencies  they waste some of the value
in the trading relationship. (The contractual friction might arise from relationship-specic investments that
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are only partially contractible.)
After the Northern rm has made its merge/contract choice, output is produced at the end of the rst
period. Following a merger, the pairing of rms remains together into the innite future. However, a
contract is dissolved after one period, and the Northern rm searches again and repeats the entire process in
the next period. We assume that match quality is independently and identically distributed through time.
(The informal justication of one-period contracts is as follows. If a pairing wished to stay together for
two periods, they would also want to stay together forever because the environment is stationary over time.
However, in the case of an innitely-lived pairing, a merger dominates a contract in prot terms. Therefore,
contracts will last only for one period.)
We follow Grossman and Helpman (2002) in adopting a transactions cost approach to the integra-
tion/outsourcing decision. This is in the tradition of Coase and Williamson, and it views integration as
(entirely) resolving contractual problems. (McLaren, 2000, also adopts a transactions cost approach.)
An alternative approach to analysing contractual frictions is the property rightstheory of Grossman and
Hart, and Hart and Moore. Antràs (2003) analyses the integration/outsourcing decision in this tradition,
as do Antràs and Helpman (2004). In the property rightsapproach, vertical integration does not resolve
contractual frictions. However, by allocating residual control rightsover assets (i.e. ownership of assets),
integration alters the threat pointthat emerges when the contract breaks down or doesnt apply.
Whether the transaction costor property rightsapproach is preferred depends upon the exact details
of the vertical relationship one has in mind. To the extent that integration entails joint prot maximisation
(as merger does) and the acquirer obtains the targets blueprints (and is able to exploit them as e¢ ciently
as the target could), then the transaction costapproach (integration resolves contractual frictions) seems
appropriate.
We derive the cut-o¤ between contracting and merging by comparing present values. The present values
of both merging and contracting are increasing in the match quality that the Northern rm draws. However,
the present value of merging is more sensitive to the match-quality draw because, following merger, the
pairing of rms remains together forever. Therefore, merger becomes more likelyas match-quality rises,
and we derive a unique cut-o¤ between contracting and merging. Ceteris paribus, we show that contracting
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is made more attractive by rises in contract quality, and falls in the discount rate (more patience) and the
xed search cost. These results are intuitive.
Although rms are ex ante identical, pairings that turn out to be of a higher quality are more likely
to lead to FDI. Moreover, trading relationships organised through vertical FDI earn higher prots than do
those organised through outsourcing. This is consistent with the empirical ndings of Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2004) on the protability of MNEs relative to other types of rm.
Over time, the likelihood that a rm will merge rises. When a rm enters a new country to source
components, outsourcing provides an attractive, exible means of exploring the market for trading partners.
Eventually, after (perhaps) several contractual relationships with di¤erent temporary partners, the rm nds
a suitable permanent partner for merger. Therefore, in our model, outsourcing is equivalent to ongoing
search, whereas vertical FDI is chosen by matchedpairings.
The pattern of Chinese processing exportsover time in Figure 1 is consistent with our results. The
relative importance of vertical FDI grows over time as Northern rms become more familiar with the host
country. Accounting for the outsourcing/FDI mix in Figure 1 is an important achievement. For exam-
ple, Grossman and Helpmant (2002) nd that thick markets with many potential trading partners favour
outsourcing. However, this is not the picture in China. In Figure 1, as China has industrialised since the
mid-1980s and its export-oriented manufacturing sector has expanded, we have actually observed a growth
in vertical FDI relative to outsourcing. Thus, market thickness appears to be positively correlated with
vertical FDI.
We allow for the simultaneous free entry of rms at the start of the search process. Because higher
contract quality raises the present value of contracting, host countries with higher contract quality attract
more entry by searching rms from the North. Therefore, in the long-run steady state, when rms are
matched through vertical FDI, contract quality is positively correlated with national inward FDI intensity.
Therefore, the result of the OLI framework (Markusen, 1995) that greater contract quality (e.g. stronger
intellectual property rights) favours outsourcing over internalisationthrough FDI is primarily a short-run
result. We further extend the model to allow for endogenous contract length, growing markets, and insider
rms that are better informed than others about search possibilities.
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2 A model of interrm trade with search and matching
We set up a partial equilibrium model of a monopolistically competitive industy in a two-country world -
the two countries being the North, N , and the South, S. The main market for nal goods is in the North.
Production requires two stages, upstream (u) and downstream (d). Typically these are carried out by a
pairing of rms, which may or may not be vertically integrated by merger. Firm u sells a semi-nished good
to d, who then completes the manufacture and sells it on to nal consumers. There are potentially four
types of rm pairing - NN , NS, SN and SS - where, for example, NS involves an upstream rm in N
and a downstream rm in S. Due to a technological di¤erence, N has a potential comparative advantage
in producing d, while S has a potential comparative advantage in u, although rms who wish to produce as
SN pairings need to search for partners, which is assumed to be a costly process.
All rms are of equal size and ex ante expected e¢ ciency: however, there is an ongoing xed coordination
cost which varies depending on the goodness of t of the match, i. Since match quality,  is an ordinal
ranking, it is easy to choose units such that, seen before entering a match,  follows a uniform rectangular
probability distribution between 0 and 1, where 1 represents the most benecial match. Consequently, we
can always say that there is an ex ante probability 1  i of nding a match of better quality than i:
We focus mainly on the rm pairings of type SN , which benet from potential comparative advantage.
It is assumed that this interrm trade is a relatively recent development, following trade liberalisation, and
that the market for their output is growing. Unlike previous papers (Grossman and Helpman, 2002, Rauch
and Casella, 2003, Rauch and Trindade, 2003) we focus on the search process whereby rms nd trading
partners (as opposed to concentrating on matched pairings, once search has been completed).
In our model, rms carry out this search by trading: more specically, a rm draws up a contract with a
randomly-chosen partner, specifying the price and volume of inter-rm trade over a xed contract duration
(c.f. Spencer, 2005). Only after rms have entered into such a contract can they determine whether the
quality of the match is su¢ ciently good for it to be worthwhile continuing long-term. We term this type of
process match-searching(to distinguish it from other models, where search is carried out before trade is
started). Figure 1, below, shows a decision tree for the march-searching model we use in this paper, seen
from the viewpoint of a downstream rm in the North.
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cost E)
Stick with
existing
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indefinitely.
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Figure 1: The decision tree for the search
Demerger is
assumed to
be prohibitively
expensive
Selection/contracting stage Production stage
The match-searching model is a variant of standard search models (Kohn and Shavell, 1974). The most
important theoretical feature of these models is that searching players have to choose between sticking with
an existing partner or renewing search: there exists an unique switchpoint, i; at which a player is indi¤erent
whether to continue or resume search. In our model, we term this switchpoint the reservation match quality,
R.
1
Denition 1 The reservation match quality, R; is the match quality at which, for given contract length,
contract quality, discount rates and search costs, rms are indi¤erent whether to continue with their existing
partner or to resume search.
In a frictionless search (where rms are innitely patient) we would expect R = 1; so that rms will never
settle for a less than perfect partner. However, we assume search is costly for two reasons, both of which
reduce R. First, contracts are lumpy, being for a xed length in order to insure rms against potential
hold-up problems after they make relationship-specic investments. Some industries may be characterised
1There are parallels to the reservation wage in the labour search literature.
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by lumpier contracts than others (Antras, 2003). In combination with impatient rms (discount rate r > 0)
this leads to search friction. In addition, we assume each renewed search starts with a relationship-specic
investment cost E. In general, following Rauch and Trindade (2003) we assume that this investment is larger
(and implies lumpiercontracts) the more di¤erentiated goods in an industry are. This is discussed in more
detail in section __ below, where we endogenise contract length.
Simplifying the model, by making contract periods exogenous, allows us to dene a variable for interest
rate per contract period, ; where
1 +  = (1 + r)T ; (1)
where r is the annual interest rate and T is contract length. This is a key factor in determining behaviour
of the search and matching process.
3 Contract length, contract quality and the reservation match
quality
Figure 2a, below, shows the determination of the reservation match quality, in the simple version of our model.
Match quality, i; is dened to vary between 0 and 1 (with constant probability density ex ante).
2 For any
given market price level, P , protability, i; is monotonically increasing with respect to i: The reservation
match quality is R; yielding a prot R(R): This will be equated to the expected present discounted value
of abandoning a current partner and renewing search. Free entry and exit in a monopolistically competitive
model will also usually equate R(R) = 0:
3
Firms with matchings to the left of R will be loss-making, and are termed searching pairings. Those
to the right will be protable, and will choose to stick with their existing partner when the contract comes
up for renewal - consequently, we term them matched pairings. Proportion R of pairings are initially
searching, and the average loss incurred by a searching pairing is s = Area AR . Likewise, proportion 1  R
of initial pairings is initially matched, making an average prot of m = Area B1 R .
2Specically, for simplicity, we assume i a¤ects an ongoing xed cost, rather than unit variable costs, so that output of a
rm pairing is not a function of i. This is fairly easily relaxed.
3This relationship holds so long as we are looking at a growing industry, where there is continuous entry of new rms.
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Figure 2: determination of reservation match quality
2a) No differences in contract quality
between merged and unmerged firms
2b: Profits are reduced for unmerged firms by
contractual difficulties
Searching firms Matched
At time 0, on average rms are making a loss (area A is bigger than area B). The extent of this loss
depends on the position of R - the higher R is, the more rms will be loss-making in the rst period, and
the average loss of a searching rm will be higher, and the average prot of matched rms will be less. In
addition, the proportion of searching rms declines at a rate of (1  R) for each contract period, so that a
high reservation match quality (which implies picky rms) means only slow convergence. Such a process will
only be acceptable to rms if  is low, which means either low interest rates, r, or short contract periods.
Proposition 1 The relationship between area B (the rst period prots of successfully-matched rms) and
area A (the rst period losses of unsuccessfully matched rms) is determined by the formula
Area B
Area A+ E
=

1 + 
: (2)
(See Appendix 1 for the derivation of equation (2)). A higher value for R will lower area B raise area
A, implying that  must fall. When  = 0 (innitely patient search), area B will equal zero.
Figure 2b introduces the idea of ine¢ cient contracts for searching rms (those with i < R). In this
case, we are assuming that, where rms have a relationship based on contracted outsourcing, protability
is reduced to ki, where k (0 6 k 6 1) reects the contractual environment, which di¤ers across countries.
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Firms can overcome these contractual problems by merging, but, since we assume demerger is prohibitively
expensive, this will only be done once rms have settled on a long-term partner. Consequently, we assume
that rms with i > R will merge quickly.
Reducing protability for searching rms will a¤ect the determination of R. Specically, area A is
reduced as k falls (unless there is a compensating fall in R), which implies that the reservation match
quality will be reduced, the lower is k. We can summarise this result as:
Proposition 2 Any given pairing of rms are more likely to settle for merger the lumpier is contracting, or
the poorer the contracting environment, as measured by k.
This relationship is monotonic.
Figures 3-4 summarise the e¤ects of these trade-o¤s. First consider a rm which makes its rst, random
match and nds it is of quality i = m1. Whether this will be an acceptable long-term match depends
on combiness the lumpiness of the contract (summarised by , which depends primarily on the industry
concerned) and on contract e¢ ciency, k, which is assumed to depend mainly on the countries concerned.
The lower is  or the higher is k, the pickier rms can a¤ord to be, and the less likely they are to accept
a long-term partner of match quality m1. We have drawn in the locus R = m1, which is the combination
of {k; } which make the rm indi¤erent whether to continue with a match of quality m1 or not. For
combinations of {k; } which lie below this line, the rm will see a match of quality m1 as temporary only,
and so will choose an outsourcing relationship for the duration of its existing contract. For {k; } above the
line, the rms are less fussy, and will choose a long-run merger. Note the locus R = m1 slopes upwards
to the right, indicating that there is a trade-o¤ between the levels of k and  which make rms indi¤erent
whether to merge.
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Contract quality k
Contract lumpiness r
Firms with match quality m1 choose
to merge
Firms with match quality m1 choose
to outsource
locus mR=m1
Contract quality k
r
mR=m1
mR=m2
mR=m0
mR=m3
Increasing mR
Figure 3: Effects of contract quality and lumpiness on
the decision to outsource or merge, given a particular
contract quality
Figure 4: Effects of contract quality and lumpiness on
reservation match quality
Figure 4, above, develops the relationships in Figure 3 further, by showing as a contour map the combi-
nations of {k; g which correspond to a variety of di¤erent levels of R. As we move downwards to the right
(increasing k or decreasing ) the reservation match quality increases.
3.1 Implications of the reservation match quality
The reservation match quality, R, is the most important parameter in determing search behaviour. A higher
rate of R implies that rms are pickier in terms of their partners - implying that the search process will
take longer, in terms of contract periods. The mean lag (average number of contract periods taken to merge)
will equal
L =
R
1  R
: (3)
Consequently, a rise in  or a fall in k will result in a shortening in the number of contracts which rms
undergo on average before merging.
Linked to the e¤ects of higher R in terms of slower matching, the average ratio of searching to matched
rms will tend to be higher, even in the long run, in a growing economy. If rms were innitely-lived and
there were no growth in demand over time, the economy would tend towards a steady-state equilibrium
where all rms were matched (i > R). However, If the number of rms in the industry were growing at
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rate G, the long-run ratio of the number of contracting rms, NC , to merged ones, NM , would become:
NC
NM
=
G
1  R
: (4)
This implies that,
Proposition 3 For a given growth rate of demand, the long-run equilibrium share of contracting to merged
rms is lower, the lumpier is contracting or the poorer the contracting environment, k.
This follows since NCNM is increasing with respect to reservation match quality, R, which, in turn, is
decreasing with respect to  or k.
A third e¤ect is that, if  is lower, or k higher, so that the reservation match quality, R, is higher, then
the mean match quality in the long run will be higher. This follows since raising R means that the least
e¢ cient matched rms will no longer stick with their existing partners, hence raising the average.
Connected to this is the e¤ect on prices. We dene
Denition 2 The reservation price of a pairing of rms based in countries c and d, PRcd, is the minimum
level of the market price at which a new pairing would start a search.
It is relatively trivial to show that PRcd is declining in terms of Ccd, the underlying variable production
cost for the pairing, and declining in terms of R (since higher R implies that, in the long run, only pairings
of a higher e¢ ciency will survive). As long as the industry continues to grow, so that new rms are still
entering, and as long as SN is the pairing with potential comparative advantage, then the industry price
will be PRSN . A rise in R implies that new entrants must be prepared to supply at a lower price.
Proposition 4 The lumpier is contracting, or the poorer the contracting environment, k, the higher will be
the reservation price of new rm pairings, and the lower will be the long-run e¢ ciency of the industry.
The proof is that R is decreasing in with respect to k (Proposition 1 ) or . Lower R implies rms in a
reservation quality matching are bearing a higher match-related cost, which must require a higher price to
make entry protable. Also, a lower R implies lower quality matchings will survive in the longer run - so
lowering average quality.
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Note that this lower entry price means that, in the early years of search, rms will, on average, bearing a
larger loss, as they carry out a longer search. Also that new rm pairings of type SN will be competing with
historic pairings NN . Anything which lowers R will make new pairings type SN less competitive relative
to existing NN pairings. Beyond a threshold, trade may simply not take place:4 this is likely to be the case
in industries with lumpy contracts in countries where the legal/contractual environment is poor.5
4 Insider versus outsider rms
We have established in the preceding sections that lumpy contracts and/or poor contracting environments
tend to favour a faster merger over outsourcing, but beyond a point they may prevent vertical inter-rm
trade altogether. We wish to extend the analysis to the situation where not all searching rms are equal.
More specically, we follow Rauch and Trindades (2002) analysis, based on the idea that ethnically-based or
other trading networks can give a minority of insiderrms an advantage over others. This approach can be
extended to show why ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historic colonial ties regularly appear as signicant in
gravity analyses of trade. Insider rms start with a better information set than their rivals, so that, instead
of match quality i varying between 0 and 1, for insiders it varies between L and 1 (L> 0).
We apply this approach to our match-searching framework. The model is unchanged from that above,
except that there is a subset of insiderrms for whom the minimum quality match, after they have been
through pre-screening, is now of quality L, rather than 0. This will a¤ect the search process, since it will
also lead insiderrms to ask for a higher reservation match quality, which we denote 00R, before accepting
a merger. This process is summarised in Figure 5, below.
4These threshold e¤ects in outsourcing trade have been noted, among others, by Yi (2003).
5This nding is borne out by Nunn (2007).
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Figure 5: Effect of a lower minimum match quality
threshold for insider firms
Profit p
Once a minimum quality threshold of L is introduced, the proportion of searching rms becomes
R L
1 L ,
which is also the rate of exponential decay in the probability of rms searching as we move from one contract
period to the next. Raising the minimum quality threshold to L will initially lower the expected loss of
searching rms, as well as lowering the proportion of searching rms. A corollary of this is
Proposition 5 where the underlying cost advantage of the South is relatively small, only insider rms from
the North will enter as potential partners.
This follows since pairings of an insider Northern rm with a Southern partner have better average
quality, and so require a lower reservation price P 00RSN than that of outsider pairings PRSN : It follows that
there must be levels of cost for NN pairings such that P 00RSN < PRNN < PRSN :
This proposition must be slightly qualied in the longer run: search may make new pairings of an outsider
rm in N with a southern partner uncompetitive relative to existing NN pairings or insider SN pairings,
but if the supply of these latter rms is limited, and if demand is growing, then in the long run the market
price must rise to the point where outsider SN pairings begin to compete.
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5 The e¤ect of making contract length endogenous
We have deliberately separated the endogenous determination of contract periods from the analysis so far
in the paper. This is because, while there are a number of practical reasons to believe that factors such as
relationship-specic costs and the contractual environment will a¤ect the length of contract periods, as well
as the reservation match quality, the exact theoretical mechanism is harder to pin down.
We set up a stylised game where rm u faces a choice of whether or not to spend E, which cannot be
veried by rm d. If rm u makes the investment, it will save a random amount ki2 or
i
2 (depending on
whether the match is good enough to justify merger) per annum over the period of the initial contract. d
will save a similar amount. If rm u does not make the investment, then all rm d will perceive is a very low
observed level of i: Consequently, the contract needs to be long enough that, on average, rm u expects to
be better o¤ risking the relationship-specic investment rather than deceiving its partner. This is shown in
Figures 6a-b, below.
Match quality mi
10
Profit per annum
pR
A
B
pi=p(m)
Match quality mi
10
Profit per annum
mR
p*R
A*
B*
p(mi)
m'RmR
C
m*R
Figures 6a-b: The effect of a reduction in contract quality for searching firms upon reservation match quality, with
endogenous contract length
6a: Contract length T=Relationship-specific expenditure E/Area C
6b: Lower contract efficiency reduces reservation match quality
both by increasing loss during search and by lengthening
contract period (by making C smaller)
C*
Looking at Figure 6a rst: this is the same as Figure 2a, except that we have drawn in an Area C, equivalent
to
Area C=
1Z
i=0
((i)  (0))@i; (5)
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in other words, the expected average di¤erence in prot (across all potential matches) relative to the worst
potential match. This is the di¤erence between the prot (per annum) the rm gets if it makes the investment
E, compared to if it deceives its partner. Contract length, T will be su¢ cient to yield

1 + 
=
rE
Area C
;
Area B
Area+ E
=
rE
Area C
. Substituting from (2) (6)
Figure 6b shows the e¤ect of lowering contract e¢ ciency, k, for searching rms. In this case, area C is
reduced, implying  must be higher and contracts must be longer. In consequence, there are now two factors
reducing R: the lower prot (as before) and the longer search period. A conclusion is
Proposition 6 if contract periods are endogenous, then the e¤ects of contract e¢ ciency upon reservation
match quality, mean merger lags and reservation prices are enhanced, compared to the model with exogenous
contract periods.
This follows since, if raising k now a¤ects R both directly and through raising , then its e¤ects on
variables which depend on R will be enhanced. In summary, the e¤ects of changing variables in equation
(6) are as follows:
E¤ect of/on BA+E  T R PR
Raising r + + + - +
Raising E + + + - +
Lowering k + + + - +
6 A more formal model
The preceding sections have aimed at giving qualitative insight into the e¤ects of contract lumpiness, con-
tractual e¢ ciency and insider-outsider di¤erences in a search-based trade model. However, to quantify these
e¤ects, and gauge their importance, we need to specify more specic functional forms. This involves for-
mally laying out models of the competitive structure, the matching process and the e¤ects of institutional
parameters.
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6.1 Competitive structure
The industry is assumed to be monopolistically competitive, on the lines of Krugman (1979). There are
both xed and sunken costs (in the form of a relationship-specic investment, E). Subject to these, rms
can enter or exit the market, although they need a partner (existing or new) in order to produce saleable
goods. The elasticity of substitution between nal goods varieties is " (> 1)6 , which closely approximates
the own-price elasticity for the output sold by rm pairings, at least as long as the number of rms, N , is
large.
Since the love-of-variety model is fairly standard, important equations are summarised in Table 1, below
Table 1 Important equations of the
monopolistically-competitive model
Utility U = A
"
1 "
 
NX
i=1
Y
1 "
"
i
! "
1 "
: (7)
Price charged by pairing i Pi = "" 1Ci; i 2 fN;Sg: (8)
Output of pairing i Yi = A( "Ci(" 1)P )
 ": (9)
Industry aggregate price P  = A
1 "
"
 
NX
i=1
P
" 1
"
i
! " 1
"
: (10)
Prot of pairing before xed cost i = C
1 "
i P
"; where  = A" (
"
" 1 )
1 " (11)
Prot after xed cost (merged pairing) i = C
1 "
i P
"   F + i; where F > 1: (12a)
(unmerged pairing) i = C
1 "
i P
"   F + ki; where 0 6 k 6 1: (12b)
Following Grossman and Helpman (2002), we assume matching a¤ects xed rather than variable cost -
this is done primarily to make the model more tractible.7 More specically, there is an ongoing xed cost of
between 0 and 1, which is inversely linearly related to the quality of the match i between rms in pairing
i. assume that xed costs are F   i for merged pairings and F   ki for unmerged pairings.
We assume that merger is forever - if two rms merge, then any subsequent demerger would entail
prohibitive costs.
6The restriction " > 1 is associated with consumersassumed love of variety, and also helps ensure nite pricing by rms.
7The attraction of assuming that matching a¤ects xed, rather than variable costs, is that match quality a¤ects only
protability, not price or sales. This is somewhat at the expense of realism, but improves the tractibility of the model. It is also
possible to set up the model where variable cost, Ci, is a function of i: results are available from the authors. The principal
conclusions of this paper are una¤ected.
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6.2 Derivation of the reservation match quality
The ex ante probability distribution for match quality (for outsider rms) is uniform and rectangular over
the range 0 6 i 6 1. The prot of a reservation quality match (i = R) is zero. Prot increases linearly
with respect to match quality, so that the expected prot of a successful match (where R < i < 1) is
1+R
2 minus the prot of a reservation quality match. This yields an expected prot of
1 R
2 : Likewise, an
unsatisfactory match will have an expected prot of  R2 : Finally note that a renewed search will yield a
present discounted value of zero.
Table 2 Probability Expected prot First period
Match above reservation prots/losses for pairings
Satisfactory (1  R) 1+R2   R = 1 R2 Area B prots of successful (1  R)2
Unsatisfactory R
kR
2   R = (k 2)R2 Area A losses of successful (2  k)2R
Both areas on Figure 2 are quadratic expressions in terms of R, so it should be no surprise that, in
this model where prots are a linear function of match quality, the relationship in equation (2) reduces to
a quadratic expression in R: Solving this, and taking the only feasible root (0 6 R 6 1), we derive a
relationship between R; ; k and E (see Appendix 1 for derivation)
R =
1 + 
1  (1  k)  
p
(1 + )(2  k)+ E(1  (1  k)))
1  (1  k) : (13)
Note that we would expect a rise in , k or E to reduce R: When E = 0 and k = 1, (13) simplies to
R = 1 +  
p
(1 + ): (13a)
6.3 The threshold price
We assume that, prior to a reduction of trade costs, all production is by pairings NN , at a marginal cost of
CNN and all charging a markup as in equation (8). Since monopolistic competition ensures that a marginal
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pairing of reservation quality will break even, we can deduce by rearranging (11) that
P 0 = [
F   RN

]
1
"C
" 1
"
NN ; (14)
where RN is the reservation match quality for a pairing of northern rms, which may di¤er from RS if the
contractual environment in the North and South di¤ers.
Following liberalisation, the marginal pairing is now type SN; producing at a combined marginal cost of
CSN , so that monopolistic competition will drive the industry price, P , to equal
P 1 = [
F   RS

]
1
"C
" 1
"
SN ; so that (15)
P 1
P 0
= [
F   RS
F   RN
]
1
" (
CSN
CNN
)
" 1
" : (15a)
Note that existing pairings in the North of NN will vary in e¢ ciency between RN and 1; and that some
of these may still remain protable even after trade is liberalised.
6.4 Insider rms
In the case of insider rms, Table 2 can be rewritten as:
Table 3 insider rm Probability Expected prot First period
Match above reservation prots/losses for pairings
Satisfactory 1 
0
R
1 L
1+0R
2   0R = 1 
0
R
2 Area B prots of successful
(1 R)2
1 L
Unsatisfactory 
0
R L
1 L
k(0R+L)
2   0R: Area A losses of successful 2
0
R(
0
R L) k(02R 2L)
1 L :
Again, substituting into equation (2) produces a quadratic expression for 0R; which can be solved to
yield
0R =
(1 + )  L
1 + (k   1)  
p
((1 + )  L)2 + (1 + (k   1))(k2L   (1 + ) + (1 + L)E)
1 + (k   1) : (16)
When L = 0, (23) reverts to equation (12).
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A minimum threshold match for insiders, L, reduces the risk of search. Consequently, insider rms will
have a higher reservation match quality, 00R; than outsiders, and
@00R
@L
> 0; so the reservation match quality
rises the better-placed the insider rm is.
6.5 Endogenous contract periods
We wish to formalise the relationship in equation (6). In our linear model, area C, the expected saving per
annum for the upstream rm from having a match quality greater than zero, will satisfy
Area C =
1  (1  k)2R
4
: (17)
(See Appendix 1 for the derivation). The contract period must be just long enough that these savings com-
pensate rm u for the expense of making a relationship-specic investment, E:Consequently, (16) becomes

1 + 
=
4rE
1  (1  k)2R
=
1  2R
(2 K)2R + E
: (18)
Note that, the shorter is the contract period, T , the lower is ; and the larger is (1+) : Consequently, for
a given interest rate, r and a given relationship-specic investment, E, the shorter is T , the higher s needs
to be.
Solving (18) fully requires solving a highly complicated equation for  in terms of r, k and E, after
substituting in for R from (13) (see Appendix 1). In practice, this is best solved numerically. Results are
shown in Figures 7a-b, Appendix 2, for a variety of combinations of k and E, in the case where r = 0:05.
These conrm that higher contract quality implies shorter contracts and a higher reservation match quality,
while higher relationship-specic costs lengthen contracts and lower reservation match quality.This analysis
conrms that, at least on one possible account of contract length determination, the e¤ects of contract
quality on reservation match quality are enhanced, because a poor contracting environment leads to longer
contracts, raising  and lowering R: Figure 8, which shows that, once endogenous contract periods are taken
into account, the mean lag in rms merging increases sharply with k, at least when E = 0:6. Interestingly,
the mean merger lag in years is increasing with respect to the relationship-specic cost, E: this is because
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the e¤ect of increasing the contract period length, T , outweighs that of reducing R.
7 A numerical example
In order to illustrate the e¤ects of contractual environment, contract lumpiness and insider/outsider discrep-
ancies, we develop a numerical example. A product market is assumed to have been liberalised a few years
ago, and to be growing rapidly. The South is assumed to have a potential comparative advantage (before
taking account of search costs) in the upstream stage of production, while the North has an advantage in
downstream production, giving a slight potential competitive advantage to SN pairings: unit variable cost
is assumed to be 92:5% of that of NN pairings. We assume the following parameter values:
Table 4 NN pairing Outsider SN pairing Insider SN pairing
Unit variable cost see text 1 1
Interest rate, r 5% 5% 5%
Basic xed cost, F 1 1 1
Minimum match quality 0.3 0 0.3
Contract quality 0.9 varies varies
Rel-specic.cost varies varies varies
The issue is, assuming this market is growing (so new pairings are entering), how big does the cost
advantage have to be for the entering pairings to be SN , rather than NN?
New pairings in the North have two potential advantages. First, all NN pairings have insider advantage
(represented in our simulation as a minimum quality threshold L = 0:3). Only a small number of Northern
rms have a comparable insider advantage when dealing with potential Southern partners (these are classed
as insider SN pairings). The second advantage is that the contractual environment in the North is assumed
to be relatively good, giving a contract e¢ ciency of k = 0:9 for unmerged pairings. (This setup still gives
some advantage to rms which merge.)
Given these potential factors favouring Northerners, we wish to plot, as a function of relationship-specic
cost, E, and contract quality in the South, k, whether or not SN pairings are competitive with new NN
pairings. This is shown in Appendix 2. Figure 7, below, also summarises the e¤ects of E and k on the
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search/entry decision.
Figure 7: Entry of insider and outsider
pairings, when unit variable cost is 0.925 for
SN pairing, against 1 for NN pairing. F=1.
No trading
pairings
enter
Only insiders
enter
More outsourcing
in a growing market
Insiders and
outsiders
enter
Relationship-specific cost, E
Unmerged
contract
quality k
More
Mergers
The rst implication of Figure 7 is that poor contract e¢ ciency in the South deters SN pairings from
entering, particularly when they are outsiders (rather than the small pool of insider rms). In our simulation
where F = 1 this is particularly the case where relationship-specic costs are low - however, when F is higher,
this is reversed (see Appendix 2 ). We therefore get three zones in Figure 7 : in the rst, where k in the
South is low, no SN pairings at all enter, and production remains entirely in the North. Moving up slightly
from this, insider SN pairings only will enter: these might, for example, be old colonial trading rms, or
maybe ethnic Chinese or other relevant ethnic networks. With their better local knowledge, these can reduce
somewhat the e¤ects of poor contractual environment. However, these rms are assumed to be limited in
supply, so once they have entered, new trading entry may dry up.
In our example (where underlying comparative advantage is not enormous), outsider SN pairings will
mostly enter when k is high (so they will concentrate in Southern countries with relatively good contracting
environment - as in Nunn, 2007). These rms will enter rst as outsourcers, but will merge over time.
However, the share of outsourcing may remain signicant even in the long run if market growth is substantial,
and if R is high - hence, outsourcing is likely to be more prevalent in the long term where k is high and E
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is low.
8 Conclusion
In common with a number of previous studies, we have examined the role of search in the choice between an
outsourcing relationship or vertical FDI. The main di¤erence is that search is seen as an ongoing process, with
aspects of learning-by-doing, and the value of outsourcing is its relative exibility, while the main value of FDI
is to reduce transational costs, which in turn vary according to the national legal/institutional environment.
As such, our analysis is in the tradition of Nunn (2007) in emphasising the importance of legal/institutional
quality as a determinant of trade, at least within di¤erentiated industries with high relationship-specic
costs.
A key feature of our model is that it di¤erentiates static and dynamic results. Poor institutional quality is
particularly costly to outsourcers. On the one hand, it may deter search altogether, by raising the reservation
price of searching rm pairings in a particular market. However, if underlying comparative advantage is
strong, then this may o¤set the increased search costs, so that rms still engage in search. In this case, the
FDI decision will be sped up - consequently, we would agree in the short-run with Markusens (1995) OLI
nding that poor contract quality favours FDI, although adding the caution that this does not apply in a
long-run steady-state, where all rms will merge in our framework.
A poor institutional environment in a particular country may limit trade to a relatively small number of
rms with pre-existing ties (as in Rauch and Trindade, 2002). Again, these are likely to engage in FDI.
The dynamics of our model indicate that, as a new exporter grows in size, outsourcing will tend to
precede FDI. This is somewhat contradictory to Grossman and Helpmans (2002) prediction (based on a
thin markets model with search before trading) that increasing market size will imply an increasing share of
outsourcing. We argue that the Chinese experience tends to support our predictions, and perhaps supports
the existence of a search-by-matching process.
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Appendix: algebraic derivation of the reservation match quality
General functional form
The solution should satisfy the condition
Discounted prot with a successful match = one period expected loss with a poor match + sunk cost.
Expected average joint prot with a successful match is m; which occurs with probability (1  R) and
lasts forever. Discounted to the start of the rst contract period, this has the value
(1 + )

(1  R)m;
where  (r; T ) is an adjustment factor for contract period length.
The expected loss with a poor match is  s, which occurs with a probability R, and lasts for 1 period
only. Discounted to the start time, this has present value
 Rs;
while there is also a one-o¤ xed cost, E, related to the search. Equating the present expected value of
starting a search to zero, this gives us the result
(1 + )

(1  R)m = Rs + E:
However, we also note that
 =
1 + 

(1  1
1 + 
) = 1:
Also note that, in Figure 2a), area B = (1  R)m and area A = R: Hence we get the relationship
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(1 + )

Area B = Area A + E;
Area B
Areaa+ E
=

1 + 
: (2)
Linear functional form
Table 2 Probability Expected prot First period
Match above reservation prots/losses for pairings
Satisfactory (1  R) 1+R2   R = 1 R2 Area B prots of successful (1  R)2
Unsatisfactory R
kR
2   R = (k 2)R2 Area A losses of successful (2  k)2R
Looking at the decision from the point-of-view of a pairing deciding whether to renew search
1 + 

(1  R)2 = (2  k)2R + E;
(1 + )(1  2R + 2R) = (2  k)2R + E;
(1 +   (2  k))2R   2(1 + )R + (1 + )  E = 0;
(1 + (k   1))2R   2(1 + )R + (1 + )  E = 0;
R =
1 + p(1 + )2   (1 + (k   1))((1 + )  E)
1 + (k   1) ;
=
1 + 
1 + (k   1)  
p
(1 + )(1 +   (1 + (k   1))) + E(1 + (k   1))
1 + (k   1) ;
=
1 + 
1  (1  k)  
p
(1 + )(2  k)+ E(1  (1  k)))
1  (1  k) : (13)
Endogenisation of the contract period
To formalise this condition: say the expected rate of saving per annum to rm u if it makes the investment
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is the probability-weighted sum of the saving if it does or does not merge:
s =
1
2
[(1  R)
1 + R
2
+ R
kR
2
] =
1  (1  k)2R
4
: (17)
Then the contract period must be just long enough that a ow of payments at rate s are just enough to
compensate rm u for the expense of making a relationship-specic investment, E :
E = s
tZ
t=0
e rt@t =
s
r
[1  (1 + r) T ];
where r is the annual interest rate. Note that
1  (1 + r) T = 
1 + 
:
Consequently,
s =
(1 + )

rE;
1  (1  k)2R
4
=
(1 + )

rE: (18)
Note that, the shorter is the contract period, T , the lower is ; and the larger is (1+) : Consequently, for
a given interest rate, r and a given relationship-specic investment, E, the shorter is T , the higher s needs
to be.
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Appendix 2: numerical simulations of making contract periods
endogenous
Figures 7: Effect of contract quality and relationship-specific cost on
a) Contract length                                                              b) Reservation match quality
assuming 5% per annum interest rate
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Figure 8: Effect of contract quality and relationship=
specific cost on mean merger lag in years
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Calculation of the breakeven cost level for a NS pairing (insider
or outsider)
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Start with a modication of (15a)
P SN
P NN
= [
F   RS
F   RN
]
1
" (
CSN
CNN
)
" 1
" :
For the breakeven price, we have
P SN
P NN
= 1;
so
(
CSN
CNN
)
1 "
" = [
F   RS
F   RN
]
1
" ;
CSN
CNN
= [
F   RS
F   RN
]
1
1 " :
Figures 7a-b: Relative entry prices of outsider and insider pairings, related
to contract quality and relationship-specific costs
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